On May 8, 2018, Donald Trump addressed Americans from the White House Diplomatic Reception Room. The 12-minute speech announced the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal his predecessor and arch-rival, Barack Obama, had signed in 2015.
Titled the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, it was an agreement designed to limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
“The fact is this was a horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made. It didn’t bring calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will,” Trump said at the time.
The deal with Iran will go down as one of the most incompetent ever made. The U.S. lost on virtually every point. We just don’t win anymore!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) September 3, 2015
Eight years later, the US and Iran find themselves in a remarkably similar position. Another deal is on the table and, according to Trump and his officials, a far superior one. The name is different. The stakeholders are different.
On Wednesday, the two countries signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, a 14-point framework aimed at ending a conflict in the Middle East that had stretched to around 110 days.
As soon as its text was made public, comparisons were being drawn with the Obama-era agreement Trump once dismantled.
Also read: US, Iran Sign Peace Deal. Tehran Says “Time To Test The Implementation”
At the G7 summit in France, Trump did not hold back. “And you know what the Iranians did?” he said. “They laughed at Obama, and they said, ‘He’s a stupid son of a bit*h.'” He insisted his deal was far superior and that the US was not paying Iran anything to sign it.
For Trump, who has regularly cast himself as a superior negotiator to Obama and has trumpeted the MoU as a legacy-defining achievement, the contrast with his predecessor loomed large over the entire proceedings.
But how different are the two agreements, really?
A Framework vs A Finished Deal
The most significant distinction between the two is what each document actually is. The JCPOA, negotiated over 18 months, ran to more than 150 pages and was packed with technical annexes, specific benchmarks, inspection protocols and centrifuge limits. It was a binding, comprehensive agreement with multiple international parties including China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
The Islamabad MoU is none of those things, at least not yet. It is a 14-point ceasefire and negotiating roadmap, bilateral in nature, with the technical details to be worked out in the 60 days that follow. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has argued the new deal will differ from the JCPOA partly because the US will keep “the military option” on the table.
The Nuclear Weapons Pledge
Both agreements include a commitment from Iran not to acquire nuclear weapons, but the level of detail differs considerably. The JCPOA stated explicitly, “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.”
The MoU uses similar language, with Iran affirming “that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” How that commitment will be enforced, however, is left entirely to future negotiations.
Uranium Enrichment: The Thorniest Issue
Under the JCPOA, Iran was required to reduce its uranium stockpile dramatically, cap enrichment levels at 3.67 per cent for 15 years, confine all enrichment to a single facility at Natanz, and accept limits on the number and type of centrifuges it could operate. Roughly 97 per cent of Iran’s nuclear stockpile at the time was shipped out of the country.
The MoU leaves all of this unresolved. It says the two sides “agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material,” with a minimum standard of downblending Iran’s enriched uranium on site under IAEA supervision. Whether the material will be destroyed, removed or simply reduced in grade is not specified. Centrifuges are not mentioned at all.
The situation is considerably more fraught than it was in 2015. Iran now holds uranium enriched to 60 per cent purity, just short of the 90 per cent threshold for weapons-grade material. When the JCPOA was signed, Iran’s stockpile was far less advanced.
Trump appeared unbothered by the urgency of the situation. Speaking at the G7, he noted that much of Iran’s 60 per cent enriched material is believed to be buried under rubble following US airstrikes. “Nobody is going to get that for a long time, unless we want to get it,” he said, adding that it is “not valuable” and “nobody’s touching it.”
He also appeared to leave room for Iran to maintain a civilian nuclear programme. “If you say that somebody wants it, other people have it, other adjoining states have it, and you’re not letting them have it for purposes of electricity and things like that. It’s always a little tough. You have to use a little common sense,” he said.
The JCPOA was that its restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme were time-limited, with key provisions set to expire after 10 and 15 years.
The MoU contains no sunset clauses. Whether a final deal will include them is not yet certain.
Sanctions Relief
The structure here is broadly similar. Under the JCPOA, Iran received phased sanctions relief, verified by the IAEA and tied to a schedule set by both the agreement and the UN Security Council. Multiple countries that had imposed their own sanctions were party to the deal.
The MoU similarly envisions sanctions being lifted on an agreed schedule, as part of a final deal. The key difference is that the MoU is a bilateral US-Iran agreement. How third countries that have imposed their own sanctions on Tehran, including European nations, will respond is not yet clear.
Notably, the MoU grants Iran waivers for oil and petroleum exports from the moment it is signed, ahead of any final agreement.
The $300 Billion Reconstruction Fund
Point six of the MoU commits the US and its regional partners to developing “a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least USD $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The JCPOA contained no such provision.
Trump was quick to downplay this. “We are not investing any money in Iran, by the way,” he said in France. “The rumor got out there yesterday, it was ridiculous. We have the right to go in some day and do, if I want to do something or if somebody wants to do something. But we are not investing any money, we have no obligation to invest any money in Iran.”
For context, in 2016, the Obama administration did return $1.7 billion to Iran to settle a long-standing dispute dating to before the 1979 revolution. Iran had paid the US $400 million for weapons that were never delivered. The remainder was interest on that sum. Trump constantly brings up this “payout” in his digs at Obama.
Ballistic Missiles And Terror Financing
Neither deal addresses these issues in any meaningful way. The JCPOA was widely criticised for not placing limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme or its support for armed groups across the Middle East. The MoU does not mention ballistic missiles either.
Trump said on Wednesday he thought it “okay” for Iran to hold ballistic missiles in proportion to what neighbouring states possess. “If other countries have them, it’s a little bit unfair for them not to have some,” he said. “A ballistic missile is not the same thing as what we’re talking about when we talk nuclear.”
There is no mention in the MoU of Iran’s funding of armed groups or its treatment of political dissidents, despite Trump having promised earlier this year that help was “on the way” for Iranian protesters.
60-Day Clock Is Ticking
The MoU gives both sides 60 days to negotiate a final agreement, extendable by mutual consent. That deal, if reached, would be endorsed by a binding UN Security Council resolution under Point 14 of the memorandum.
It would not be the first time both sides have sat across the table in apparent good faith. In June last year and again in February this year, officials from Washington and Tehran were said to be making progress, meeting after meeting. Then the bombs started falling.
Whether this time ends differently is the only question that matters.
