Islamabad:
On September 10, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Sajjad Haider Khan was asked how Islamabad would honour its obligations under the Mecca pact after the Houthi barrage on Saudi Arabia escalated. There was “no such thing under discussion right now,” he said, adding that Pakistan would act under the agreement when the time came.
The same day, Reuters reported that Islamabad had warned Iran to rein in its Yemeni allies. Within hours, Pakistan told the media that no military response was on the table and then sent a message to Tehran that its partners were pushing it towards one.
The two messages were addressed to different audiences about different stages of the same problem, and the weeks that followed repeated the pattern.
On September 25, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif told the UN General Assembly that any threat to Mecca and Medina was a red line. The same day, Field Marshal Asim Munir met Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman in Riyadh at a gathering of Mecca pact allies’ defence chiefs on intelligence cooperation, military coordination and capability integration.
On 2 October, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar described the Tehran side of the conversation in unusual detail. He said he raised the pact with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on the margins of the UN meetings in New York and briefed them on how Pakistan would honour it. Iran, he said, had floated a political approach to the Houthis as an alternative to military action. He stressed that this was brainstorming between two foreign ministers, not a written offer.
Three days later, ministers of Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia met in Riyadh and agreed to deploy forces. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said afterwards that Islamabad and Ankara were present in the operational area in a supportive role, that Pakistan was involved in reconnaissance, and that only Saudi forces were fighting.
It was the most operational public statement any Pakistani minister had made since the August signing, and it fits the distinction drawn by Tehran-based analyst Javad Heiran-Nia, who noted that Iran tolerates the defence of Saudi territory but treats offensive action against the Houthis as a red line.
Iran’s response came in two registers. First, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei on October 4 said that Tehran hoped the deployment reports were untrue. After the activation, state media took a sharper tone, and the Tasnim news agency ran a headline accusing Turkey and Pakistan of joining the Saudi war.
Whether a reconnaissance role would satisfy Tehran is unclear. Asif did not specify whether it takes place over Saudi territory, along the Yemeni border, or through intelligence passed to Saudi-led forces. The joint statement gave no troop numbers or equipment lists.
The Houthis have drawn their own conclusions. Official Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti has reportedly warned Pakistan and Turkey of retaliation if they deploy in support of Riyadh, though Houthi commentary since the activation has largely assumed that neither country will join the war directly.
This stance is not new. Pakistan has run on two tracks since the spring. On March 3, Dar told the Senate that he had reminded Araghchi of Pakistan’s defence obligations to Saudi Arabia and that the Iranian foreign minister had asked for assurances that Saudi territory would not be used against Iran.
In October, the Saudi track acquired a committee and a communiqué, and the Iranian track a more sceptical audience. Dar’s account of October 2 is the latest on the record: both Pezeshkian and Araghchi, he said, wanted the Houthi matter concluded. Iran has not publicly disputed it.
